Just a Gwai Lo

Richard Posner: “The narrative points to something different, banal and deeply disturbing: that it is almost impossible to take effective action to prevent something that hasn't occurred previously. Once the 9/11 attacks did occur, measures were taken that have reduced the likelihood of a recurrence. But before the attacks, it was psychologically and politically impossible to take those measures. The government knew that Al Qaeda had attacked United States facilities and would do so again. But the idea that it would do so by infiltrating operatives into this country to learn to fly commercial aircraft and then crash such aircraft into buildings was so grotesque that anyone who had proposed that we take costly measures to prevent such an event would have been considered a candidate for commitment.”

Posner argues the report, which I have not yet read, is excellent in terms of quality of writing, is very flawed in its analysis and recommendations. It criticizes Presidents Clinton and Bush for “narrow and unimaginative menu of options for action” when Posner writes that instead “[t]he options considered were varied and imaginative” but not feasible. He then lists recommendations that the narrative section of the report implied would be made—there is a risk that they could be read as Posner's recommendations, which is not necessarily true (except the biometric passport recommendation)—compared to the recommendations actually made. The main argument Posner is making, though, is that the commission, much like American culture, is predisposed to ascribing the success of a surprise attack to structural problems rather than the fact that the attack was, by definition, inconceivable, or, in Nassim Taleb's words, a black swan. Americans have been successful in planning for an attack similar to Sept. 11th, but the problem is that the next major attack will be nothing like what they have planned for.

A shipbuilder capable of designing a four-stack steamer that can carry thousands of passengers across the Atlantic would seem to be an intelligent person, right? But why wouldn't they question their own hubris and install enough lifeboats in case—just in case—the ship hits an iceberg and sinks on its maiden voyage? Or how about a film actress savvy enough to make it in the Hollywood system, landing several high-profile roles, making lots of money, but who doesn't question the logic of stealing an armfull of clothes she could easily afford at a Saks 5th Avenue store? Or how about a man clever enough to survive the presidential electoral process, but dumb enough to accept sexual favors from an intern?

I've been saying this for some time. People call President Bush a dumb man, and there is no doubt truth in that statement, but we're comparing him to Clinton, who, as we see in the above quote, was not such a smart man after all. Anyway, back to reading the article in question:

So if you damage the area Carl Wernicke identified, which is the area involved with assembling coherent sentences from words, then they can still understand language, but when they speak it um figger want over because have and you'd trouble cuz say what understand if. (Yoda a mild case of Wernicke's aphasia have, yes?)

Kinda cool how he introduces a concept ("assembling coherent sentences from words") and procedes to implement the opposite of that concept (the author assembling an incoherent sentence with words).